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“I AM THE CREATOR”: BIRGITTA OF SWEDEN’S 
FEMININE DIVINE 
 
by Yvonne Bruce 
 
Critical writings about Saint Birgitta of Sweden (1302/3–1373) adopt a 
curious tone: the literature marvels at her wide-reaching political, ec-
clesiastical, and secular influence, remarkable for a woman even in an 
age that saw Saint Catherine of Siena and Julian of Norwich achieve 
religious authority while maintaining popular appeal. Yet this marvel is 
checked by hesitation; surely no fourteenth-century mystic could have 
achieved such authoritative status except as an orthodox agent of the 
church, and historians have typically been cautious of seeing Birgitta as 
a forerunner of the Reformation. Ingvar Fogelqvist, for example, is 
reluctant to “judge the later Middle Ages through the viewpoint of the 
Protestant Reformation,” yet his own study of “apostasy and reform” in 
Birgitta’s Revelations reveals the saint’s struggles between old ideas 
and “new reformatory ones.”1 Joan Bechtold attributes Birgitta’s 
articulation of the feminine to “internal struggle, rather than ... simple 
acquiescence” to a masculine ideology, but negates her “feminist victo-
ries” by asserting that she “rose to power by defending a system created 
by men more fervently than did her male counterparts”; a few lines 
later, Bechtold notes that Birgitta’s aristocratic background partly “ex-
plains the restraint she felt towards any subversive visionary or political 
activity.”2
The critical dilemma confronting an interpreter of Birgitta’s life and 
writings is twofold: how does one reconcile Birgitta’s zealous and 
iconoclastic reform activities—which often affronted the papacy and 
the Swedish monarchy—with her ostensibly orthodox goals and didac-
 
1Ingvar Fogelqvist, Apostasy and Reform in the “Revelations” of St. Birgitta (Stock-
holm 1993) 17. 
2Joan Bechtold, “St. Birgitta: The Disjunction Between Women and Ecclesiastical 
Male Power,” Equally in God’s Image: Women in the Middle Ages, ed. Julia Bolton 
Holloway, et al. (New York 1990) 89, 88. And see Kari Elisabeth Børreson’s comprehen-
sive essay, “Birgitta’s Godlanguage: Exemplary Intention, Inapplicable Content,” in 
Birgitta, hendes værk og hendes klostre I Norden (Birgitta, her Works, and her Five 
Abbeys in the Nordic Countries), ed. Tore Nyberg, Odense University Studies in History 
and Social Sciences, vol. 150 (Odense 1991); Børreson believes that “Birgitta displays an 
exemplary feminist intention. Nevertheless, the androcentric impact of Birgitta’s writings 
makes her doct[r]inal content inapplicable” (23). 
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tic Revelations? Second, how can one claim “feminist victories” for a 
woman whose “background placed social and ecclesiastical limitations 
on her ability to conceive of possibilities for women apart from male 
structures”?3
The key to understanding Birgitta’s role lies in reevaluating the cen-
tral features of her life’s work, the Revelations. Birgitta herself is the 
chief subject and fulcrum of this visionary doctrine; thus, the work re-
quires a reading that shifts critical focus from her role as church repre-
sentative to her own self-fashioned agency.4 My purpose in this essay is 
not to rescue Birgitta from charges of “antifeminism” nor to determine 
whether she ultimately undermined or reinscribed patristic doctrine, but 
to demonstrate her very indifference to these larger issues. The Revela-
tions are radical because Birgitta puts herself at the very center of her 
supposedly Christo-centric work, partaking of divine authority for her 
own personal and female, as well as social and (proto)feminist goals. 
She manages this in three primary and inseparable ways: by presenting 
her revelations as the unmediated voice of God, a move that positions 
her “as a prophet in the tradition of the Hebrew prophets”;5 in her 
identification with Mary, whom she elevates to triune status; and 
through the juridical motif that figures prominently in her visions, by 
which she authorizes her own word as law. The Revelations indirectly 
questions medieval notions of women’s relationship to church hierar-
chy because Birgitta remains self-consciously ignorant of female infe-
 
3Bechtold (n. 2 above) 100. 
4This is, indirectly, an important point for Birgitta’s latest biographer, Bridget Morris, 
who provides a complex definition of what Birgitta’s initial “calling vision” was not: it 
was not for her sake, but “for the salvation of others. She was not to experience a mysti-
cal unio with God, in the manner of many of her predecessors ... Her role was essentially 
as a conduit of moral guidance to other people and actively to participate in their salva-
tion. The word ‘mystic’ is therefore less applicable to her than ‘visionary’ or ‘prophet’” 
(St. Birgitta of Sweden, Studies in Medieval Mysticism, vol. 1 [Suffolk, Eng. 1999] 65–
66). See also F. R. Johnston, “The English Cult of St. Birgitta of Sweden” in Analecta 
Bollandiana: Revue critique d’hagiographie 103.1–2 (1985) 75–93, at 76. Birgitta is 
specifically a conduit, a conductor of “spiritual fluid,” and hence the importance to her 
visions of her material self (Revelations, bk. 6.52.9–10 [see n. 18 below]). See also Mar-
guerite Tjader Harris’s edition of Birgitta’s Vita, in Birgitta of Sweden: Life and Selected 
“Revelations,” trans. Albert Ryle Kezel, intro. Tore Nyberg (New York 1990) 75 and 90, 
for example; and Morris 66–67. This specific materialism is one of the distinguishing 
features of the visions of medieval women and a crucial point of female spirituality for 
Luce Irigaray (q.v.).  
5Claire Sahlin, “Gender and Prophetic Authority in Birgitta of Sweden’s Revelations,” 
in Gender and Text in the Later Middle Ages, ed. Jane Chance (Gaineseville, FL 1996) 
74. 
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riority. Her writings thus anticipate the feminist strategy of, as Eliza-
beth Grosz expresses it, “indifference to [phallic authority] presented as 
interest or commitment.”6
Birgitta’s revelations number approximately seven hundred, and 
their editing history is exceptionally tangled. Birgitta dictated her 
revelations in Swedish to her confessors, who transcribed them into 
Latin; none of these transcriptions survive. There are extant two pri-
mary and mostly complete Latin manuscripts of the Revelations, as 
well as numerous partial manuscripts (and seven extant Middle English 
manuscripts, most of them probably translated from the Latin manu-
script kept at Syon Abbey, the Birgittine order established at Twicken-
ham, England, in 1415).7 Given this palimpsest of sacred material, 
scholars are understandably reluctant to attribute specific utterances to 
Birgitta or to determine which of the many voices speaking in the 
Revelations belongs exclusively to her. And yet, it is impossible to 
deny the consistency and urgency of the voices animating the Revela-
tions. My goal in this essay is to observe the larger patterns of gendered 
expression in the Revelations and, I hope, to suggest the ways in which 
Birgitta’s forceful and distinctly female concerns show through the 
overlay of masculine emendation. It is likely, for instance, that the most 
significant textual revisions, undertaken by her confessor and “editor-
in-chief” Alphonso Pecha (at divine suggestion) were authorized and 
directed by Birgitta herself before her death.8 The Revelations cleverly 
“quarries male theology for women’s use,” as Birgitta was well aware 
of the doubts about her authenticity expressed by both her spiritual tu-
tor and primary confessor, Mathias Övidsson—with whom she parted 
before leaving Sweden—and by the male-dominated clergy of which he 
was representative.9
6Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (London 1990) 187.  
7See the manuscript history prefacing each book of the Revelations (n. 18 below); also 
Morris (n. 4 above) 3–9 and 198–199; for the textual history of the Middle English manu-
scripts, see Johnston (n. 4 above) 79–80, and the first part of William Patterson Cum-
ming’s introduction to his edition of The Revelations of Saint Birgitta, Early English Text 
Society, no. 178 (London 1929). 
8Claire Sahlin makes the same point: because of the difficulty in determining the ex-
tent to which the visions and revelations are solely Birgitta’s, she is “examining textual 
representations of issues concerning gender and authority in the Latin editions of the 
Revelations and not necessarily Birgitta’s actual words” (“Gender and Prophetic Author-
ity,” [n. 5 above] 72). Morris (n. 4 above) 6, uses the phrase “editor-in-chief.” 
9Quoted in St Bride and Her Book: Birgitta of Sweden’s “Revelations,” trans. from 
Middle English by Julia Bolton Holloway (Newburyport, MA 1992) 10. Holloway’s 
methods make many medieval scholars uneasy; I have relied on her chiefly for her recog-
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Birgitta is hardly alone among medieval women visionaries in using 
God’s authority to advance her own doctrinal perspectives; it is the 
inseparability of human and divine will that lends authority to the mys-
tic—male or female—and the fascination of visionary literature comes, 
in part, from tracing this tangle of personality and doctrine. Birgitta, 
however, claimed far more for herself in her life and writings than any 
other visionary woman. Unlike most mystics, she married and bore a 
large family, beginning the Revelations upon her husband’s death 
(1344) and continuing with it until her own in 1373. She came from a 
powerful family with a tradition of legal practice and scholarship. Her 
father, Birger Persson, was governor of Uppland, the seat of the Swed-
ish monarchy; he rewrote Sweden’s pagan law code, the Vig Saga, to 
reflect the country’s increasing Christianization. Birgitta’s maternal 
grandfather belonged to the long-ruling Folkung family and was him-
self governor of East Gothland. Birgitta was related to the Swedish 
monarchy and even tutored Queen Blanche; sections of the Revelations 
address the royal couple’s extravagant lifestyle and Sweden’s role in 
Continental politics. It was to King Magnus that Birgitta appealed for 
help in establishing her Ordo Sanctissimi Salvatoris, the Order of the 
Most Holy Savior. Magnus donated the royal castle at Vadstena for the 
purpose and levied a tax to pay for additions and upkeep.10 It was for 
this order that Birgitta wrote her Regula, or Rule, and the breviary for 
the Vadstena nuns, Cantus Sororum, Song of the Sisters (consisting in 
part of the Sermo Angelicus, the Angelic Conversation), both included 
in the Revelations. 
It seems clear that Birgitta drew upon her legalistic heritage in 
framing her Revelations and in writing the Regula; in all her writing 
she not only appropriated the masculine tradition of prophet but, ac-
cording to Julia Bolton Holloway, created “a Swedish and European 
Bible for the fourteenth century.” Holloway calls the Revelations “a 
book of books,” and regarding the works written for her order, remarks 
that Birgitta’s “is the first instance (except for Saint Clare) where the 
woman writes the Rule and establishes the Order.”11 And, of course, no 
 
nition of Birgitta’s mystical singularity—Holloway is one of the few students of the 
Revelations to suspect their possibly subversive content. See Harris’s edition of the Vita 
(n. 4 above) 78 and 80, on the spiritual state of Master Mathias. 
10See Helen M. D. Redpath, God’s Ambassadress: St. Bridget of Sweden (Milwaukee 
1947), esp. chaps. 1 and 2; Johannes Jørgensen, Saint Bridget of Sweden, trans. Ingeborg 
Lund, 2 vols. (London 1954) vol. 1, passim. 
11Holloway (n. 9 above) 125, 134. 
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other medieval woman has inspired such consistent devotion; not only 
did Birgitta’s Mariology spur Continental interest in the Virgin and, 
further, enrich doctrinal debate about Mary’s status within the church, 
but Birgitta’s Order of the Holy Savior at Syon Abbey is the only cur-
rently operating monastic order established by a medieval woman to 
have remained functioning continuously since its founding (by Henry 
V).12 Given Birgitta’s powerful presence in Continental politics, 
spirituality, and papal reform, the words of Jesus that begin the Revela-
tions take on a peculiar resonance: “I am the Creator of Heaven, I am 
one in divinity with the Father and the holy Spirit” (“Ego sum creator 
celi et terre, unus in deitate cum Patre et Spiritu sancto”).13 The Revela-
tions repeatedly emphasizes Birgitta’s own status as virgin, bride, and 
mother, strengthening her identification with Mary and mirroring the 
Trinity that speaks through her. Her unmediated voice of God—the 
insertion of the “I” that is both God and Birgitta—and her Trinitarian 
exempla are thus related strategies of prophecy. 
Luce Irigaray, in “Divine Women,” laments that there “is no woman 
God, no female trinity: mother, daughter, spirit ... [woman] is fixed in 
the role of mother through whom the son of God is made flesh ... the 
virgin’s relations with the Father always remain in the shadow.” Iriga-
ray is here speaking of a Christian tradition that values the feminine 
only through its procreative link to the masculine, a relationship simul-
taneously devalued by the “amorphous, formless” (“amorphe, in-
forme”) aspect of the womb.14 But Birgitta illuminates this relationship 
 
12See Morris (n. 4 above) 6, 171–172; and Neil Beckett, “St. Bridget, Henry V and 
Syon Abbey” in James Hogg, ed., Studies in St.Birgitta and the Brigittine Order, 2 vols. 
(New York 1993) 2.125–150, passim. 
13Revelations 1.1.1. Further references to the Revelations in the text and notes will be 
cited by book, chapter, and verse numbers. The publication information for the books of 
the Revelations, which are in various stages of availability in print and online, is as fol-
lows: Birgitta of Sweden, Revelaciones, bk. 1, ed. Carl-Gustaf Undhagen, Royal Acad-
emy of Letters History and Antiquities (Uppsala 1977); bk. 2, ed. Birger Bergh, St. 
Birgitta of Sweden Website 1999, Editio Princeps (Lübeck 1492), critical edition in 
preparation by Birger Bergh http://www.umilta.net/birgitta.html; bk. 4, ed. Hans Aili, 
Samlingar utgivna av Svenska Fornskriftsällskapet [SFSS], ser. 2, Latinska skrifter, vol. 
7.4 (Göteborg 1992); bk. 5: Liber Questionum, ed. Birger Bergh, The Royal Academy of 
Letters History and Antiquities (Uppsala 1971); bk. 6, ed. Birger Bergh, SFSS (Arlöv 
1991); bk. 8, ed. Arne Jönsson, St. Birgitta of Sweden Website 1999, Editio Princeps 
(Lübeck 1492), critical edition in preparation by Hans Aili: 
http://www.umilta.net/birgitta.html.
14“Il n’y a pas de Dieu femme, ni de trinité féminine: mère, fille, esprit. Cela paralyse 
l’infini du devenir femme dans la maternité et la tâche de l’incarnation du fils de Dieu ... 
Ses rapports avec le Père demeurent toujours dans l’ombre.” In Luce Irigaray, Sexes et 
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first through her emphasis on the Virgin as widow: “I was as a widow, 
by the fact that I had a son on earth who did not have a fleshly father” 
(“ego fui quasi vidua, eo quod habui filium in terris, qui non habuit 
carnalem patrem,” 4.53.2). Birgitta/Mary is widowed another way, too: 
through the death of the son, who is a manifestation of his heavenly 
father, who in turn is Birgitta’s heavenly husband. One of Birgitta’s 
most striking images of the triune motif, however, not only establishes 
a female trinity, but also, in conflating it with the masculine, asserts its 
authority: “If someone spoke through a pipe having three holes and said 
to the one listening: Never out of this opening will you hear my voice, 
he should not be blamed if afterward he spoke through the two re-
maining holes. Thus it is now in our speech. For although my mother 
the virgin said that this was to be the final letter sent to the king [Mag-
nus], so this is the message to be understood as referring to the king’s 
own person. But now I God, who am in the mother and the mother in 
me, send my messenger to the king.”15 
In this extraordinary passage Birgitta rewrites gospel: God responds 
here as Christ in John 14.10: “Do you not believe that I am in the Fa-
ther and the Father is in me?”16 Not only does Birgitta substitute the 
mother for the father, she also casts herself as messenger, as Christ 
does in the context of the biblical passage: “the words that I speak are 
not spoken of myself; it is the Father who lives in me accomplishing 
his works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father is in me” 
(10–11). Birgitta aligns herself with a divine Mary, with Christ the 
messenger, and even with the voice of God—for who is the pipe but 
Birgitta, a mute instrument till animated by divine afflatus? In this 
complex image, then, not only are the Godhead represented, but also 
the Birgittine trinity. And not only does the three-holed pipe imply 
spiritual conflation, but more subversively, perhaps, the physical con-
flation/equation of male and female that Birgitta elsewhere in her work 
insists upon spiritually. 
 
Parentés (Paris 1987) 74, 71. Translated text is taken from Gillian C. Gill, Sexes and 
Genealogies (New York 1993) 62, 59. 
15(Deinde dei filius loquebatur ad me dicens:) “Si aliquis loqueretur per fistulam 
habentam tria foramina et diceret audienti: Numquam ex isto foramine audies vocam 
meam, non esset arguendus, si postea loqueretur per duo reliqua foramina. Sic eciam est 
nunc in locucione nostra. Nam licet mater mea virgo dixerit, quod illa esset vltima littera 
mittenda regi, hoc intelligendum est de persona sua. Sed nunc ego deus, qui sum in matre 
et mater in me, mitto nuncium meum regi” (8.48.18–20). 
16All biblical references are from the New American Bible. 
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It is this conflation that paradoxically demonstrates Birgitta’s “indif-
ference” to phallic authority/church hierarchy. Lacan, in “God and 
Woman’s jouissance,” believes that the “perverse jouissance” ex-
pressed by feminine mysticism is beyond the phallus and thus unsigni-
fiable. He cites as an example Bernini’s sculpture of Saint Theresa—
you only have to look at it, writes Lacan, “to immediately understand 
that she’s coming ... [but] [w]hat is she getting off on?”17 Lacan makes 
clear that while Saint Theresa’s jouissance is obvious, it is also inexpli-
cable. Lacan’s interpretation depends for its success, of course, on the 
objectification of the female, on her lack of agency; he sees Saint 
Theresa as seductive rather than subjective. For what can Lacanian 
analysis make of a woman who authorizes herself and the role(s) of 
women rather than serving only as a receptacle of jouissance? How is 
Saint Theresa’s sexual climax obvious to Lacan if Bernini has some-
how captured her inexplicability? Irigaray insists that mysticism, while 
“beyond the phallus,” is not unsignifiable: “This is not a jouissance that 
women cannot know or say; rather it is a jouissance that Lacan cannot 
hear for he does not know how, or even where, to listen.”18 And yet, 
Lacan here anticipates later objections to Irigaray’s attempt to entirely 
 
17“[C]’est comme pur Sainte Thérèse—vous n’avez qu’à aller regarder à Rome la 
statue du Bernin pour comprendre tout de suite qu’elle jouit ... Et de quoi jouit-elle?” In  
Le séminaire, Livre XX: Encore 1972–1973 (Paris 1975) 70. Translated text is taken from 
Bruce Fink, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX 1972–1973 (New York 1998) 76. 
18Grosz (n. 6 above) 175. An anonymous reader of my manuscript argues that she 
finds “Irigaray’s work [and thus this essay] essentializing and embedded in paradox. To 
argue for a ‘feminine language’ or discourse is to deny the negativity that structures lan-
guage itself. Lacan says that ‘woman does not exist’—what he means by this is that 
woman is a symptom of language’s inability to refer. Thus she becomes associated with 
all that juridical discursive structures must abject in order to imagine themselves as co-
herent ... ‘the feminine’ is a patriarchal fantasy.” I doubt there is any way out of this 
paradox, save for cutting it right through the middle. Objections to Irigaray’s essentialism 
always puzzle me: is her paradoxical theorizing any more paradoxical than the often 
tautological linguistic monolith put into place by psychoanalysis? There is value for 
literature in the Lacanian model of behavior, chief of which may be the idea that lan-
guage itself is the problem, not the sex underpinning constructions of gender. And yet, to 
work with (and within) this model, Irigaray must embed herself in its self-referential 
structure. Irigaray can hardly be “blamed” for essentialism when she is simply using the 
master discourse. To escape the paradox, one must eschew the structure (as American 
feminists have tended to do). Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, and Julia Kristeva, with varying 
degrees of complicity, must necessarily subvert their own feminisms. 
As Toril Moi points out, Irigaray cannot resist attempting to name the feminine, 
which, according to Irigaray herself, cannot be done. And yet, Irigaray is fully aware of 
her transgression, which is one reason why she is so indebted to Derrida’s serpentine 
journey through language. See Jacques Derrida, particularly his remarks on citation, in 
“signature événement contexte,” Marges de la Philosophie (Paris 1972).  
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free women from objectification when he wonders what and where 
Saint Theresa’s “coming” is from. The difficulty Irigarayan theory (and 
indeed all feminist psychoanalytic discourse) faces is “positionality,” 
defining a female jouissance that is neither Other nor masculine: Eliza-
beth Grosz suggests the feminine “cannot describe itself from outside 
or in formal terms, except by identifying itself with the masculine, and 
thus by losing itself.” She goes on to describe Irigaray’s strategy for 
challenging Lacan’s phallogocentrism as “laughter, disinvestment of 
interest, indifference presented as interest or commitment.” Irigaray 
proscribes masculine discourse but cannot prescribe a feminine alter-
native (the effort to do so—to name, delineate, delimit—is itself a fea-
ture of masculine discourse); instead, her own theoretical writings 
mimic male psychoanalytic discursive practices to achieve her feminist 
ends, what Grosz calls “a strategy for utilizing ... a ‘machinery’ hostile 
to one’s interests so that it works against itself.”19 Considering 
Birgitta’s spiritual goals, this strategy might also be a way to mimic 
male discourse without the irony or mockery typically associated with 
Irigarayan discourse but with a certain spiritual joy. 
Irigaray’s strategic machinations do not simply subvert Lacanian 
discourse; her “Divine Women,” for example, is written with Ludwig 
Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity very much in mind, and she is not 
content with Feuerbach’s anthropological and essentialist explanation 
of the Trinity (despite the charge of “essentialism” continually leveled 
at Irigaray), even though his Trinity seems to substitute the Mother of 
God for the Holy Spirit as the third aspect of the triune God, because 
“the personality of the Holy Spirit is a too vague and precarious, a too 
obviously poetic personification of the mutual love of the Father and 
Son, to serve as the third complementary being.” Yet the Virgin’s status 
is posited contingently on the Son’s masculinity in a protopsychoana-
lytic way: “The son—I mean the natural, human son—considered as 
such, is an intermediate being between the masculine nature of the fa-
ther and the feminine nature of the mother; he is, as it were, still half a 
man, half a woman, inasmuch as he has not all the full, rigorous con-
sciousness of independence which characterizes the man, and feels 
himself drawn rather to the mother than to the father ... the son’s love 
for his mother is the first yearning of man towards woman—his first 
humbling of himself before her ... Necessarily, therefore, the idea of the 
 
19Grosz (n. 6 above) 175, 178 (quoting Irigaray), 187. On “positionality,” see Toril 
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Mother of God is associated with the idea of the Son of God—the same 
heart that needed the one needed the other also.”20 
“Divine Women” takes issue with Feuerbach’s paradoxical treatment 
of the Virgin: in The Essence of Christianity she is first elevated to ex-
plain spiritual mediation between Father and Son and in this way is 
associated with both the Son and Holy Spirit; but because her material 
aspect is female she is relegated to a male-dependent role, lacking rigor 
and physical or spiritual autonomy. As Naomi Schor observes, Irigaray 
seeks not to define women (“a task better ... left to men”), but to mi-
metically transform woman’s masquerade: “the real in Irigaray is nei-
ther impossible, nor unknowable: it is the fluid.” Schor is here speaking 
of physical fluid, the “mater-ialism” of Irigaray’s scientifically-tinged 
criticism of essentialist discourse, but the fluid, as Irigaray’s idée fixe, 
works also figuratively to describe women’s playful reappropriation of 
the feminine. That is, the fluid may be described or defined in terms of 
the container that contains and thus shapes it. And yet, as Irigaray ex-
presses it, “To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to try to recover 
the place of her exploitation by discourse ... It also means ‘to unveil’ 
the fact that, if women are such good mimics, it is because they are not 
simply resorbed in this function.”21 Birgitta, too, displays a typically 
generous and canny relationship to the fluid in her Revelations. As 
Birgittine scholars have long noted, she frequently refers to herself as a 
conduit, or channel (canalis) for divinity, which expresses itself in fig-
 
Moi, Sextual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (London 1985) 136–138, 140. 
20“[D]enn die Persönlichkeit des heiligen Geistes ist eine zu vage und prekäre, eine zu 
sichtlich blos poetische Personification der gegenseitigen Liebe des Vaters und Sohnes, 
als dass sie dieses dritte ergänzende Wesen hätte sein können ... Der Sohn—ich meine 
natürlichen, menschlichen Sohn—ist an und für sich ein Mittelwesen zwischen dem 
männlichen Wesen des Vaters und dem weiblichen der Mutter; er ist gleichsam noch halb 
Mann, halb Weib, indem er noch nicht das volle, rigarose Selbstständigkeitsbewusstsein 
hat, welches den Mann charakterisirt und mehr zur Mutter als zum Vater sich hingezogen 
fühlt ... Die Mutterliebe des Sohnes ist die erste Sehnsucht, die erste Demuth des Mannes 
vor dem Weibe.” Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christenthums (Suttgart-Bad Cann-
statt 1960) 86, 87. Translated text is taken from The Essence of Christianity, trans. 
George Eliot, intro. Karl Barth (New York 1957) 70, 71. 
21Naomi Schor, “This Essentialism Which is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray” 
in differences 1.2 (1989) 38–57, 47, 50; Luce Irigaray, Ce Sexe qui n’en est pas un:
“Jouer de la mimésis, c’est donc, pour une femme, tenter de retrouver le lieu de son ex-
ploitation par le discours ... C’est aussi “dévoiler” le fait que, si les femmes miment si 
bien, c’est qu’elles ne se résorbent pas simplement dans cette fonction” (Paris 1977) 74. 
Translated text is taken from Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke, This Sex Which Is Not 
One (Ithaca 1985) 76. And see Børreson’s analysis of the difference between the Birgit-
tine and Julian trinities. Birgitta, unlike Julian of Norwich, does not feminize the divine, 
but “divinises the female by making Mary Christotypic” (n. 2 above, 22). 
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ures of thirst-quenching liquid or wine. This is a strategy by which 
Birgitta can align herself not only with the Old Testament prophetic 
tradition, but also with Christ as the incarnation of his Father: no one 
comes to the Father but through the Son. In book 5, however (known as 
The Book of Questions, Liber Questionum), with her usual imagistic 
complexity Birgitta expresses the Son as the wine and Mary as the ves-
sel.22 
Irigaray’s discursive relationship with Feuerbach is far more com-
plementary and rewarding than her relationship with Lacan; her phi-
losophical objectives have more force than her reactions to psychoana-
lytic discourse. Feuerbach, much as Lacan, anticipates or grounds some 
of Irigaray’s key speculations on woman’s spirituality: 
 
Certainty is the highest power for man; that which is certain to him is the 
essential, the divine. “God is love:” this, the supreme dictum of Christian-
ity, only expresses the certainty which human feeling has of itself, as the 
alone essential, i.e., absolute divine power, the certainty that the inmost 
wishes of the heart have objective validity and reality, that there are no lim-
its, no positive obstacles to human feeling, that the whole world, with all its 
pomp and glory, is nothing weighed against human feeling. God is love: 
that is, feeling is God of man, nay, God absolutely, the Absolute Being. 
God is the optative of the human heart transformed into the tempus finitum,
the certain, blissful “IS,”—the unrestricted omnipotence of feeling, prayer 
hearing itself, feeling perceiving itself, the echo of our cry of anguish.23 
22She does so to answer the first question asked in the Tenth Interrogation (i.e., why 
did God choose to hide his divinity, as it were, in the flesh of humanity?); it is a response 
sandwiched between the moralizing praise lavished on Mary in the Ninth Interrogation, 
and the subsequent response in the Tenth that addresses God’s omnipresence and unique 
ontology: “In my own self I am, who is above all and outside all, who is within all and all 
within me, and without me is nothing” (“in me ipso sum, qui supra omnia et extra omnia 
sum, qui intra omnia sum et in me sunt omnia et sine me est nichil,” 5.10.20). See Morris 
(n. 4 above) 66–67; Børreson (n. 2 above) 25, 41; and n. 4 above. 
23Gewissheit ist für den Menschen die höchste Macht; was ihm gewiss, das ist ihm das 
Seiende, das Göttliche. Gott ist die Liebe—dieser Ausspruch, der höchste des Christen-
thums—ist nur der Ausdruck von der Selbstgewissheit des menschlichen Gemüthes, von 
der Gewissheit seiner als der allein berechtigten, d. i. Göttlichen Macht—der Ausdruck 
von der Gewissheit, dass des Menschen innere Herzenswünsche unbedingte Giltigkeit 
und Wahrheit haben, dass es keine Schranke, keinen Gegensatz des menschlichen 
Gemüths giebt, dass die ganze Welt mit aller ihrer Herrlichkeit und Pracht Nichts ist 
gegen das menschliche Gemüth. Gott ist die Liebe—d.h. das Gemüth ist der Gott des 
Menschen, ja Gott schlechtweg, das absolute Wesen. Gott ist das sich gegenständliche 
Wesen Gemüths, das schrankenfreie, reine Gemüth—Gott ist der in das Tempus finitum,
in das gewisse selige Ist verwandelte Optaviv des menschlichen Herzens, die rück-
sichtslose Allmacht des Gefühls, das sich selbst erhörende Gebet, das sich selbst verneh-
mende Gemüth, das Echo unserer Schmerzenslaute”; in Feuerbach (n. 20 above) 145–
146; translated text (n. 20 above) 121. On Irigaray’s relationship to psychoanalysis and 
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This describes exactly the experience of mysticism, of spiritual un-
ion with God, that Irigaray discusses at length throughout her work, in 
which the God of women (and of men) is “[j]ust an elusive memory 
that flees representation”(“si ce n’est qu’un souvenir insaisissable qui 
se dérobe à sa représentation”).24 The mystical experience “allows 
femininity to discover itself precisely through the deepest acceptance of 
patriarchal subjection.” In other words, there is a gap between feeling 
and articulation; the former may exist purely, if mutely, but it can only 
be authenticated doctrinally. This is where Irigaray’s strategy of mim-
icry, as outlined in (and by) Speculum of the Other Woman (Speculum 
de l’autre femme), can trace the impact and effect of Birgitta’s appro-
priation and exegesis of biblical writings, particularly in the first book 
of the Revelations. Speculum is structured like its nominal instrument; 
its “central section [is] framed by the two massive sections on Freud 
and Plato respectively ... as if the more fragmentary middle section 
sinks between the solid, upright volumes of the master thinkers. Within 
the middle section, the framing technique is both repeated and re-
versed.”25 It is in this middle section, entitled “Speculum,” that Irigaray 
places her chapter Une Mere de Glace, a transcription of extracts from 
Plotinus’s Enneads, a Neoplatonist treatise on the hierarchy of exis-
tence that had considerable impact on Christian thought. The Enneads 
becomes “Irigaray’s expert (literal) imitation of them. Her perfect 
mimicry manages subtly to expose his narcissistic phallocentrism.”26 
Within the illuminating concavity of Speculum’s structure, Irigaray’s 
mocking appropriation of Plotinus seeks to erase the privileged position 
of masculine discourse, to show, by the placement of Une Mere de 
Glace—so that it mirrors the discursive objects of Western thought—
that “it is, paradoxically, through the imitation of its object that the 
speculum objectifies it in the first place.”27 When Birgitta begins the 
Revelations appropriating the voice of God as her own, she too is 
holding a mirror up to the church: if she speaks as a prophet in the Old 
Testament and as Christ in the New Testament, and if her authority is 
then validated by agents of the church, then her elevation of Mary and 
 
philosophy, see Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London 
1991) 53–54. 
24Speculum de l’autre femme (Paris 1974) 242. Translated text is taken from Gillian C. 
Gill, Speculum of the Other Woman (Ithaca 1985) 194. 
25Moi (n. 19 above) 137, 130. 
26Moi (n. 19 above) 131. 
27Moi (n. 19 above) 130. 
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calls for church reform (and it is largely through Mary that Birgitta 
makes her judgments and reform demands) must likewise force those 
agents to recognize their authenticity. To further confound the distinc-
tion between her voice and the voice of God, Birgitta often conflates 
references to the Bible and to her own Revelations under the rubric 
“book.” In book 8 of the Revelations, for example, Birgitta sees an an-
gel and a fiend standing before a pulpit: “After this I saw a book glit-
tering in that pulpit, as if made of the most gleaming gold and having 
the form of a book. That very book was open, and its writing was not 
written in ink, but every single word in the book was living and spoke 
itself. No one read the writing of that book, but whatever the writing 
contained, the whole of it was seen in the pulpit and in those same col-
ors” [of which the beaming pulpit is made].28 “Justice” speaks from this 
book throughout the chapter (“iusticia de libro”). 
Or consider Birgitta’s revision of the Martha and Mary story, in a 
long chapter from book 6 of the Revelations. The biblical account of 
the two sisters, related in full in Luke 10.38–42, clearly establishes a 
hierarchy of services to God that in giving preference to the contem-
plative life of Mary also communicates her passivity: “On their journey 
Jesus entered a village where a woman named Martha welcomed him to 
her home. She had a sister named Mary, who seated herself at the 
Lord's feet and listened to his words. Martha, who was busy with all the 
details of hospitality, came to him and said, ‘Lord, are you not con-
cerned that my sister has left me to do the household tasks all alone? 
Tell her to help me.’ The Lord in reply said to her: ‘Martha, Martha, 
you are anxious and upset about many things; one thing only is re-
quired. Mary has chosen the better portion and she shall not be de-
prived of it.’” 
Birgitta’s retelling does more than explicate the usual association of 
Mary with the richer contemplative life and Martha with the active; she 
makes both lifestyles “needful” and also contextualizes the active and 
contemplative lives, so that the former may approach equality with the 
latter: 
 
Know therefore, that even though the part of Mary is best, nevertheless, that 
 
28“Post hec autem in ipso pulpito vidi librum resplendentum quasi aurum fulgentis-
simum et habentem formam libri. Qui quidem liber apertus erat et scriptura eius non erat 
scripta atramento sed vnum quodque verbum in libro erat viuens et se ipsum loquebatur 
... Scripturum quoque libri nullus legebat, sed quicquid continebat scriptura, hoc totum in 
pulpito et in illis coloribus videbatur” (8.48.54–56). 
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part of Martha is not evil, but praiseworthy and very pleasing to God ... But 
note that Martha, when she came to me first asking for her dead brother 
Lazarus, he was not brought back to life. It was only afterward, when Mary 
was called and came, and then because of both sisters their brother was re-
vived. Thus it is in spiritual life as well. For one who perfectly desires to be 
Mary ought first to be Martha, laboring bodily in praise of me ...Thus I said 
in the gospel that Mary chose the best part. For Martha’s part is good at that 
time when she sorrows for the sins of her neighbors. Martha’s part is better 
then when she labors, as those who live and stand firm wisely and honestly, 
and she does this because of her love of God.29 
It seems likely that Birgitta is rescuing Martha in order to authorize her 
own status as wife, mother, and widow. Birgitta appropriates the voice 
of Christ, just as Paul does in 1 Corinthians when he contrasts the vir-
tues of the virgin and the wife: “I should like you to be free of all wor-
ries ... The virgin—indeed, any unmarried woman—is concerned with 
things of the Lord, in pursuit of holiness in body and spirit. The mar-
ried woman, on the other hand, has the cares of this world to absorb her 
and is concerned with pleasing her husband” (7.32–34). By subtly re-
writing Paul’s pronouncement, Birgitta is redefining the roles of 
women in relation to Christ; further, she is authorizing her “careful-
ness” in the service of God. She continually wavered between the roles 
of Mary and Martha in her own life, often agonizing over her worldly, 
“active” duties, yet in the Revelations she arrives at a workable thesis 
for reconciling the two. By providing a fully authorized matristic gloss 
on the gospel of Luke, she revises the patristic “machinery” of Paul; 
secondarily she is of course circumventing the Pauline doctrine that 
forbade women to preach. Kari Elisabeth Børreson, one of the most 
comprehensive readers of the Revelations, notes the “womancentred 
falsifications” of the gospels in book 1, in which Birgitta rewrites Luke 
1.11–20, and the Revelations are peppered with comparisons of Birgitta 
to Moses and Elijah, Old Testament exemplars of, respectively, eccle-
siastical law and prophecy.30 
29“Scito eciam, quod, licet pars Marie optima sit, non tamen ideo pars Marthe mala 
est, ymmo laudabilis et beneplacens Deo ... Sed nota, quod Martha rogans pro fratre suo 
Lazaro mortuo prior venit ad me, sed non resuscitabatur frater eius statim. Sed venit 
postea Maria vocata, et tunc propter ambas sorores frater resuscitatur. Sic eciam est in 
spirituali vita. Nam qui perfecte desiderat esse Maria, debet prius esse Martha laborando 
in honore meo corporaliter ... Ideo ego dixi in euangelio, quod Maria optimam partem 
elegit. Nam pars Marthe tunc bona est, quando dolet de peccatis proximorum. Est quoque 
pars Marthe tunc melior, quando laborat, quomodo homines sapienter et honeste viuant et 
subsistant, et hoc facit propter solius Dei dileccionem” (6.65.88–102). 
30Børreson (n. 2 above) 24. For relevant biographical information see Redpath (n. 10 
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Perhaps the most audacious of Birgitta’s strategies, and certainly the 
one that lends the most authority to her Revelations, is her selective and 
pervasive use of divine law to uphold Birgittine doctrine and to pass 
judgment on the saved and the damned. Divine law within the Revela-
tions is a complex presence: it refers not only to God’s utterances 
(whether spoken to her or pronounced without mediation through her) 
but to the juridical processes by which Birgitta expresses doctrine. For 
example, during the trial of an “ungrateful and disobedient” king in 
book 8 (“ingratum ... et inobedientem”), the Virgin Mary intervenes on 
the king’s behalf as he is about to be sentenced, and “To [Mary] the 
judge replied: It is not just, he said, to deny you anything.” The king is 
saved, and Mary ends the chapter with an explanation of God’s revela-
tion to Birgitta—why he denies her some knowledge but legitimizes 
other: “for the saints of God received the holy Spirit in diverse ways ... 
But for you it is not lawful to know or to hear or to see anything except 
the spiritual, and to write down and to tell what you see to those per-
sons as you are ordered.”31 
Mary’s role is more enigmatic in book 4, during another trial. After a 
knight and an Ethiopian argue their cases for the judgment of a soul,32 
“innumerable demons” appear and plead: 
 
“We know,” they said, “that you are one God in three persons ... You are in 
truth that charity to which are joined pity and justice ...We say more: if that 
woman you value before all others, who is the Virgin who bore you and 
who has never sinned; if, I say, she had sinned mortally and had died with-
out divine contrition, thus you esteem justice so that her soul would never 
have obtained heaven but would be with us in hell. Therefore, O judge, why 
do you not sentence this soul to us, that we may punish it according to its 
works?” ... After this was heard a sound like a trumpet’s ... and immediately 
a voice was heard speaking: “Be silent and listen, all of you angels and 
spirits and demons, to what the Mother of God is saying. [Mary then chas-
 
above) chaps. 1–3; Jørgensen (n. 10 above) vol. 1, bk. 2; Morris (n. 4 above) chaps 2–4. 
For a discussion of the passages in the Revelations and the Acta et processus canoni-
zacionis beate Birgitte related to Birgitta’s comparison with biblical figures of law and 
prophecy, and with Moses in particular, see Børreson 30–35. 
31“Cui iudex: Non est, inquit, iustica tibi aliquid negare ... Nam sancti dei diuersimode 
acceperunt spiritum sanctum ... Sed tibi non est licitum scire alia nisi spiritualia audire et 
videre et illa, que vides, scribere et dicere illis personis, quibus tibi precipitur” (8.56.93–
100). 
32Barbara Obrist writes: “In Bridget’s revelations, the Ethiopians are always those 
devils which claim a soul that is being judged. When the judgment is negative and stands 
as a condemnation, they lead the soul away.” “The Swedish Visionary: St. Bridget” in 
Medieval Women Writers, ed. Katharina M. Wilson (Athens, GA 1984) 249 n.11. 
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tises the fiends:] “O, you enemies of God! You have persecuted mercy, and 
you love justice without charity. Even though this soul appears lacking in 
good works, for which it ought not to gain heaven—nevertheless, see what I 
have under my mantle!” 
 
Mary lifts her mantle to reveal a “small congregation” (“modica ec-
clesia”) of men and women: “Then after was silence, and then the Vir-
gin was heard speaking: ‘Scripture says: who has perfect faith shall be 
able to move the mountains on the earth ... O demons,’ she said, ‘I or-
der you by the authority of the judge to attend to these things which 
you see now in justice.’”33 
Bechtold describes Mary’s role here as “attorney for the defense,” 
noting that “the final Word and the earthly conception of justice are 
distorted by Mary ... the soul is granted a reprieve from suffering the 
full impact of the Law due to Mary’s introjection of merciful silence.”34 
Mary interrupts—rather than distorts—divine law, inserting a charita-
ble if obscure silence, Irigaray’s “disruptive excess,”35 that initially 
appears to reduce Mary’s mantled church to a specular, mute feminine 
object (like Lacan’s Saint Theresa) but which in fact “speaks” elo-
quently. Through this image, and her own voice, which repeats the 
word of God and reiterates Christ’s power to judge, Mary expresses a 
changed, merciful, and feminized divine law. 
This passage is also a clever revision of the transfiguration of Christ. 
While the gospel’s revelation of Christ’s divinity depends upon the 
apostles’ expression of faith, Birgitta’s Mary reveals her divine aspect 
to the faithless fiends, “having under her mantle things of great impor-
tance, in secret, as it were ... a small congregation [of] women and men 
 
33“‘Nos,’ inquiunt, ‘scimus, quod tu unus es Deus in tribus personis ... Tu vere es ipsa 
caritas cui coniuncta sunt misericordia et iusticia ... Plus dicimus: si res illa quam pre 
omnibus diligis, que est virgo que te genuit et que nunquam peccauit, si, inquam, illa 
peccasset mortaliter et sine contricione diuina mortua fuisset, sic diligis iusticiam, quod 
anima eius nunquam obtineret celum set esset nobiscum in inferno. Ergo, o iudex, cur 
non iudicas animam istam nobis, ut puniamus eam secundum opera sua?’ Post ista audie-
batur sonitus quasi tube ... et statim quedam vox loquebatur dicens: ‘Silete et auscultate, 
omnes vos angeli et anime et demonia, quid Mater Dei loquitur!’ ... ‘O, o inimici! Vos 
persequimini misericordiam et cum nulla caritate diligitis iusticiam. Licet in operibus 
bonis hic apparea<n>t defectus, pro quibus hec anima non debet obtinere celum; videte 
tamen quid ego habeo sub mantello meo!’ ... Deinde factum est silencium, et virgo lo-
quebatur dicens: ‘Scriptura dicit: Qui habet fidem perfectam potest per eam montes trans-
ferre in mundo ... O,’ inquit, ‘demones, precipio vobis ex potestate iudicis attendere ad 
illa que in iusticia nunc videtis’” (4.7.17–32). 
34Bechtold (n. 2 above) 95. 
35Grosz (n. 6 above) 179. 
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and friends of God, religious and other” (“habens sub mantello suo 
quasi occulte res aliquas magnas ... modica[m] ecclesia[m] ... mulieres 
et viri amicique Dei religiosi et alii,” 4.7.25–27). This emblematic 
revelation of Mary is opposed to the open, male, and patristic appari-
tion Christ presents to the apostles.36 In the gospel accounts of the 
transfiguration Jesus leads his apostles to the top of a mountain: “He 
was transfigured before their eyes and his clothes became dazzlingly 
white—whiter than the work of any bleacher could make them.37 Elijah 
appeared to them along with Moses; the two were in conversation with 
Jesus... A cloud came, overshadowing them, and out of the cloud came 
a voice: ‘This is my Son, my beloved. Listen to him ...When they heard 
this the disciples fell forward on the ground, overcome with fear. Jesus 
came toward them and laying his hand on them, said, ‘Get up! Do not 
be afraid.’”38
In the Revelations, Mary’s mantle is not transfigured per se; she lifts 
it herself to reveal a congregation devoted to her. Her presence, like 
Christ’s in the gospels, is a mediating one that banishes fear from the 
godly soul; when God commands the witnesses to hear her, however, 
she responds not only with a Christlike silence, but also with her inter-
pretation of divine law. After the fiends witness Mary’s charity, Christ 
sanctions her interpretation of justice: “When this was spoken to them, 
the demons fled” (“Quibus dictis demones fugierunt,” 4.7.35). Yet in 
Birgitta’s most cunning transfiguration of Scripture in this passage, 
Mary speaks the words by which, in the gospels, Christ had banished 
the devil: the Revelations’ Mary tells Birgitta, “Scripture says: who has 
 
36See Holloway (n. 9 above) 56 n. 21 for the frequency of this emblem; see also 
Bynum’s examples of typical medieval religious iconography, in Fragmentation and 
Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York 
1992); and Elizabeth Robertson’s analysis of the uses of the female body in Julian of 
Norwich’s writings: “Medieval Medical Views of Women and Female Spirituality in the 
Ancrene Wisse and Julian of Norwich’s Showings” in Feminist Approaches to the Body in 
Medieval Literature, ed. Linda Lomperis and Sarah Stanbury (Philadelphia 1993). 
37For more of Birgitta’s clothing imagery see, for example, 4.9; see also Cumming’s 
Revelations 2.26. Book 2 of the Revelations in Latin has not been published in print yet, 
although it is available online, along with the other books, at the Birgitta and her Revela-
tions website; this is a very informational site, packed with links to other mystics’ sites, 
books of scholarly and lay interest, and online articles. See the references to books 2 and 
8 online, and note also Birger Bergh’s online remarks regarding the differences between 
the print and electronic versions of these books, the latter of which follows the 1492 
Ghotan text. 
38I have used primarily Mark 9.2–7 for the transfiguration story; for the passage in 
which Jesus tells his apostles not to fear and for the story of Christ’s casting out of the 
devil I have used Matthew 17.6–7 and 18–20. 
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perfect faith shall be able to move the mountains on the earth.” In the 
transfiguration story of Matthew, when Christ and his apostles come 
down from the mountain they are met by a man whose son is possessed 
by an evil spirit. Christ rebukes the devil and casts him out, after the 
disciples fail to, and then explains their failure as a lack of faith: “I as-
sure you, if you had faith the size of a mustard seed, you would be able 
to say to this mountain, ‘Move from here to there,’ and it would move. 
Nothing would be impossible for you.” Once again Birgitta is rewriting 
gospel indifferently; her triune Virgin judges as the Father, mediates as 
the Mother, commands as the Son—Mary is not only an aspect of the 
godhead but displays all three divine aspects in the revelations she 
claims as lawful for Birgitta. 
There is another, overarching juridical quality to Birgitta’s life and 
works, peripheral to the eight chief books of the Revelations by which 
she is known—her establishment of a feminine genealogy. Grosz 
writes: 
 
The mother/daughter relation is the “dark continent of the dark continent, 
the most obscure area of the social order” ... [which] covers over the debt 
culture owes to maternity but cannot accept ... Man’s self-reflecting Other, 
God, functions to obliterate the positive fecundity and creativity of women 
... the phallocentric reduction to maternity ... implies ... her subjection to the 
Law of the Father, her subsumption under the name of her husband, and her 
giving up her identity as a woman.39 
Irigaray puts it this way: “Respect for God is possible as long as no one 
realizes that he is a mask concealing the fact that men have taken pos-
session of the divine, of identity, of kinship.”40 
Birgitta establishes her nonsubjection to the Law of the Father, 
masking it as subjection, and thus she renews her identity as a sacred 
woman. As Holloway notes, the final section of Birgitta’s Vita, written 
by her confessors shortly after her death, “muddles together the catego-
ries of wife and widow”41 so as to take advantage of Birgitta’s status as 
worldly widow and spiritual bride. In other words, Birgitta co-opts 
marriage for her own purposes: chastity is preferable to marriage, yet a 
chaste, spiritual marriage to Christ is not only a singular example of 
 
39Grosz (n. 6 above) 181. 
40Gill, Sexes and Genealogies (n. 14 above) v. “Le respect de Dieu est possible tant 
qu’il ne devient pas évident qu’il masque une appropriation du divin, de l’identité, de la 
parenté par les seuls hommes,” Irigaray, Sexes et parentés (n. 14 above) 7. 
41Holloway (n. 9 above) 6. 
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Christ’s husbandry of the church, but also sanctifies the state of earthly 
marriage. Throughout the Revelations Birgitta worries about the secon-
dary status accorded to married life by the church fathers, yet her 
spiritual union with Christ retroactively elevated her physical union 
with Ulf, and her earthly marriage refined her commitment to Christ, 
particularly as Birgitta used marriage as an opportunity to urge her hus-
band to greater piety, perfect the management and rhetorical skills she 
would need in Rome, and practice something of the self-indulgence and 
haughtiness that made her later asceticism sweeter and more humbling 
to her.  
But Birgitta is one element of a mystical kinship of women, a net-
work for which she was largely responsible, and by which women and 
men might share in her feminine divine. Her establishment of the Order 
of the Most Holy Savior for women and men, as well as her influence 
on contemporary female visionaries, helped create a Christianity con-
tiguous to male Christianity, sometimes subverting it and sometimes 
supporting it, but faithful to the ideal Irigaray describes in terms of 
fluidity and fluctuation: “We women, sexed according to our gender, 
lack a God to share, a word to share and to become ... we are in need of 
... our elementary sentence, our basic rhythm, our morphological iden-
tity, our generic incarnation, our genealogy ... It is equally essential that 
we should be daughter-gods in the relationship with our mothers ... 
Does respect for God made flesh not imply that we should incarnate 
God within us and within our sex: daughter-woman-mother?”42 
Mother, daughter, and granddaughter form another, secular kind of 
trinity within the Revelations, as Birgitta explores her role as a daughter 
and mother in conversation with the Virgin. In book 6, Mary re-
proaches the pride of women, to which Birgitta responds as a proud 
woman: “Our mother also sat with the nobility, in the finest clothes, 
having many servants and nourishing us with honor. Why oughtn’t I 
inherit this for my daughter, who has certainly learned to bear herself 
 
42Gill, Sexes and Geneologies (n. 14 above) 71. “Il nous manque, nous sexuées selon 
notre genre, un Dieu à partager et à devenir ... il nous manque ... notre phrase élémen-
taire, notre rythme de base, notre identité morphologique, notre incarnation générique, 
notre généalogie ... Il est indispensable aussi que nous soyons filles-dieux dans la relation 
à notre mère ... Respecter le Dieu fait homme, n’est-ce pas incarner le Dieu en nous et en 
notre genre: fille-femme-mère,” Irigaray, Sexes et parentés (n. 14 above) 83–84; see also 
“Les femmes, le sacré, l’argent” in Sexes et parentés 89–102; and Je, Tu, Nous: por une 
culture de la différence (Paris 1990), chaps. 1 and 2; and René Girard, La Violence et le 
sacré (Paris 1972), chaps. 1–2. See also Morris’s biography (n. 4 above) 109–113. 
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nobly and to live with joy of the flesh, to die with great honor in the 
world?” (6.52.17–18). In this lengthy and poignant chapter Birgitta 
wrestles with her own feminine legacy while struggling to bequeath a 
different kind of morality to her daughter.43 
Two of Birgitta’s daughters, Katherine and Ingeborg, were sent to 
the Cistercian convent at Risaberga for their education; Ingeborg (to 
whom Birgitta is referring in conversation with Mary) died a Cistercian 
nun. Katherine married and, following her mother’s example, attended 
to her duties as the wife of a prominent man while encouraging her 
husband to lead a life of prayer, penance, and abstinence. In 1350 
Katherine joined her mother in Rome, where Birgitta had gone on pil-
grimage, and Birgitta asked her to stay there with her, devoting her life 
to Christ. Katherine agreed. God told Birgitta that Katherine was the 
spiritual coworker he had promised her earlier. It appears that God 
compensated Katherine’s husband for his loss by granting him an early 
death; thus widowed, Katherine vowed not to remarry but to assist her 
mother, and the two worked together, sometimes fractiously, until 
Birgitta’s death. It fell to Katherine to press for her mother’s canoniza-
tion, to run the order based at Vadstena and manage the faithful who 
had followed the two women from Rome intending to join it, and to get 
confirmation from Rome of Birgitta’s Regula, the rules she had written 
to run her order (delayed because, among other reasons, Katherine 
would not submit to changes suggested by Urban VI). This last was 
accomplished after Katherine’s death, and by the fifteenth century con-
vents run according to Birgitta’s written rule had been founded all over 
Western Europe.44 
Birgitta’s Order was founded “per mulieres primum et principaliter,” 
“for women first and principally.”45 Beyond creating a personal, fem-
inized God, Birgitta created a Christianity linking her with God and 
with other women. In “Women, the Sacred, Money,” Irigaray claims 
that women desire to set up a “different social order” and, to fulfill that 
 
43See Cumming’s translation history, Revelations xiii–xvi. On the relationship be-
tween Birgitta and Katherine, see also Morris’s biography (n. 4 above) 109–113. 
44See Redpath (n. 10 above) esp. 73–82; Jørgensen (n. 10 above) vol. 2, bks. 7–8; 
Morris (n. 4 above) 109–113; note that in Jørgensen’s work Birgitta’s daughter in known 
as Karin (Morris transcribes her name, more familiarly, as Katarina). See also Hollo-
way’s chronological chart (n. 9 above) xii–xiv; Harris (n. 4 above) 13–98; and the final 
third of Birger Gregersson and Thomas Gascoigne, The Life of Saint Birgitta, trans. Julia 
Bolton Holloway (Toronto 1991). 
45Quoted in Holloway (n. 9 above) 8. 
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desire, need “a religion, a language and a currency of exchange, or else 
a nonmarket economy. These conditions are in fact closely linked.”46 
The mystical women whose visions and writings flourished throughout 
the medieval period explored and revised these conditions of faith and 
existence, and Birgitta remains the most innovative circulator of their 
particular currency. While male mystics experiencing divine revela-
tions were seen themselves as occupying a feminine state (passive, si-
lent, emotional), the revelations of the women evolved into a distinct 
discourse, a way of exchanging information among and about women, 
using a language and imagery modeled upon that used by men, but re-
encoding the rhetoric. Thus, while women were assumed to be likelier 
receptors of mystical visions (as, variously, children or the insane have 
been considered likelier prophets),47 they used their more direct “ac-
cess” to divinity to reauthorize holy writ. Because the majority of vi-
sionary writings by women were dictated to male scribes and scruti-
nized by male ecclesiastics, their work is considered ultimately to sup-
port church hierarchy. But once the revisionary value of these texts is 
accepted, then men become the agents circulating a feminine dis-
course—or, at least, providing ecclesiastical women with the opportu-
nity to construct their own divinity.  
Birgitta and her successors at Vadstena were not entirely successful 
in convincing the papacy of their order’s orthodoxy (and thus the or-
thodoxy of its Regula, despite the guarantee of Mary in book 4 of the 
Revelations and of Birgitta’s confessors and biographers). Even by 
Birgittine standards, the Regula was an incendiary document, its 
“Mariocentric identification decidedly feminist, trespassing the bounda-
ries of ecclesiastical androcentrism.”48 And yet, the Revelations had 
been authenticated by her confessors, even though Birgitta claimed 
more for her gynocentric God than other mystics. For example, Birgitta 
 
46Gill, Sexes and Genealogies (n. 14 above) 79. “Pour accéder à une organisation so-
ciale différente, il faut aux femmes une religion, un langage, une monnaie d’échange ou 
une économie non marchande. Ces conditions sont d’ailleurs apparentées,” Irigaray, 
Sexes et parentés (n. 14 above) 93. For more on Irigaray’s relationship to the symbolic, 
and thus to her understanding of a feminine genealogy, see Whitford, chap. 4. For more 
on Birgitta’s influence in England, see Johnston (n. 4 above). For more on Birgitta’s 
influences on both male and female mystics during her lifetime, and the rise of mysticism 
in the fourteenth century, see Obrist (n. 32 above) 227–237; Bynum, Fragmentation (n. 
36 above) chaps. 4–6; and Margaret Wade Labarge, A Small Sound of the Trumpet: 
Women in Medieval Life (Boston 1986), chaps. 5, 6, and 10. 
47See Bynum, Fragmentation (n. 36 above) 134 and 188–189. 
48Børreson (n. 2 above) 54; see also 51–55; and Morris’ biography (n. 4 above) 106–
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experienced participation in Christ’s nativity, like Gertrude the Great, 
Marie d’Oignies, Hadewijch of Brabant, Adelheid of Frauenberg, and 
other visionaries. Unlike others’ visions of participation, however, 
Birgitta’s is typically unambiguous, detailed, and complex. She (or the 
divinity speaking through her) expresses her devotion in metaphors of 
maternity (a common motif in visionary writing), is present at Mary’s 
recreation of the birth of Christ (a vision Mary had earlier promised to 
give her), or, in book 6, simulates the physical pregnancy and birth in 
her heart rather than in her womb. 
 
The mother of God said to the betrothed: “Daughter, you wonder at this 
motion that you feel in your heart. You ought to know that this is not an il-
lusion, but a manifestation of something similar to the sweetness and com-
passion given to me. For just as you are ignorant of the way the motion in 
your heart came to you so suddenly and with exultation, thus the coming 
into me of my son was wondrous and sudden. For when I consented to the 
angel who announced the conception of the son of God, immediately I 
sensed in me something wondrous and living. And when he was born from 
me, he came forth from my closed maiden womb with unutterable exulta-
tion and miraculous quickness. Thus, daughter, do not fear an illusion but 
be thankful, for this movement you feel is a sign of my son’s coming into 
your heart. As my son assigns to you the new name of his bride, so I call 
you my daughter-in-law. For your father and mother, growing older and 
more quiet, are placing the burdens on the daughter-in-law, and they tell her 
there are things to be done in the home, just so God and I do things—by our 
charity—in the old and indifferent hearts of the people. We wish to show 
our friends and the world our will through you.”49 
109. 
49“... mater Dei et dixit sponse: ‘Filia, miraris de motu, quem sentis in corde tuo. 
Scias, quod non est illusio sed ostensio quedam similitudinis dulcedinis mee et miseri-
cordie michi facte. Nam sicut tu ignoras, quomodo tam subito tibi cordis exultacio et 
motus aduenit, sic aduentus filii mei in me mirabilis fuit et festinus. Nam quando ego 
consensi angelo nuncianti michi concepcionem filii Dei, statim sensi in me mirabile 
quoddam et viuidum. Et cum nasceretur ex me, indicibili exultacione et mirabili festinan-
cia clauso meo virginali vtero prodiebat. Ideo, filia, non timeas illusionem sed gratulare, 
quia motus iste, quem tu sentis, signum aduentus filii mei est in cor tuum. Ideo, sicut 
filius meus imposuit tibi nomen noue sponse sue, sic ego voco te nunc nurum filii mei. 
Nam sicut pater et mater senescentes et quiescentes imponunt nurui onus et dicunt ei ea, 
que sunt facienda in domo, sic Deus et ego in cordibus hominum senes et frigidi a caritate 
eorum indicare volumus amicis nostris et mundo per te voluntatem nostram’” (6.88.3–7). 
See Sahlin’s response to this vision and to Birgitta’s maternity in the Revelations, in “‘A 
Marvelous and Great Exultation of the Heart’: Mystical Pregnancy and Marian Devotion 
in Bridget of Sweden’s Revelations” in Hogg (n. 12 above) 1.108–109; and see Børreson 
(n. 2 above), who calls Birgitta’s vision of pregnancy “completely exceptional” 39. Bør-
reson’s tone here (and throughout her lengthy essay) is unusual. Her thesis suggests that 
Birgitta’s influence is less subversive than feminist scholars would like to make it, and 
yet she herself admits to Birgitta’s singularity and audacity in any number of areas. 
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Despite the singularity of this message from the Virgin, visions of 
maternity were not experienced exclusively nor even primarily by 
women; neither were the symbiotic pregnancies associated primarily 
with Mary, but rather with Jesus. As with their spiritual writings and 
the liturgy common to their religious orders, the visions expressed by 
women borrowed and adapted those expressed in communities of men. 
Complex cultural changes during the patristic and early medieval peri-
ods paved the way for a changed conception of Christ and an expanded 
role for his mother Mary, but the rationale behind individual experi-
ences of the Son as mother figure is fairly clear: maternity is associated 
with unqualified love, nurturance, the inextricability of physical pain or 
effort with emotional pleasure, and with the fleshly unity that at one 
time made mother and child inseparable entities. But Birgitta’s mater-
nal visions are, without exception, associated with Mary (even though 
Birgitta’s Christ expresses love for his church in traditional maternal 
terms). By envisioning Mary as the generative entity and spiritual au-
thority—to the extent that Mary not only allegorizes Birgitta’s faith by 
her pregnancy, but makes Birgitta her and God’s spiritual successor—
Birgitta’s vision neatly contradicts the physiological commonplace of 
the period, reflected in other visionary writing, by which the female 
generates the fleshy matter of the fetus and the father the spiritual mat-
ter.50 
Birgitta is clearly unique among visionary women. Those who would 
deemphasize the heterodoxy of her religious writings and practices 
might consider one of Feuerbach’s observations in The Essence of 
Christianity on the subjectivity of the man-God relationship: “And 
thus, in reality, whatever religion consciously denies ... it uncon-
sciously restores in God. Thus, in religion man denies his reason ... he 
can only believe what God reveals to him. But on this account the 
 
50Carolyn Bynum’s Jesus as Mother (Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of 
the High Middle Ages [Berkeley 1982]) is perhaps the most important study of gender in 
medieval spirituality in recent years; see in particular chap. 4, and also Bynum’s discus-
sion of Bernard of Clairvaux’s “conception of the father as disciplinarian,” vis-à-vis 
Christ as nurturing figure (116), a duty that Birgitta’s Mary also appropriates. It is inter-
esting to consider how much more “affective” (and Bynum has much to say about this 
term, 129–135) these fluid gender conceptions of the divine are in pictorial representa-
tions (and for these, see the numerous figures Bynum has collected in Fragmentation and 
Redemption, n. 41 above); it becomes easier then to understand how resistant modern 
scholars were, until recently, to clearly seeing these emblems, as opposed to reading them 
as they occurred in patristic and monastic writing. One can read Jesus as mother allegori-
cally; when one sees a figure of Christ giving suck to his faithful, however, one must 
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thoughts of God are human, earthly thoughts”51 (one is again reminded, 
inversely, of Paul in 1 Corinthians 2.11–12: “Who, for example, knows 
a man’s innermost self but the man’s own spirit within him? Similarly, 
no one knows what lies at the depths of God but the Spirit of God”). It 
is difficult to speak of Birgitta as merely an agent of the church and 
impossible to speak of her as an independent entity. Throughout her 
life, as she worked toward her personal, spiritual, political, and monas-
tic goals, she simply joined her will with God’s and went her own way. 
Whether confronting a divided papacy, or castigating King Magnus for 
his alleged homosexual inclinations, or demanding an end to the Hun-
dred Years’ War, or substituting community affections for parental af-
fections, Birgitta received from God those things she was denied as a 
fourteenth-century religious woman. By sublimating her earthly im-
pulses in the service of God she was able to channel those impulses, her 
beliefs, and idiosyncrasies in order to change a rich internal relationship 
and a visionary rule into a reality per mulieres primum et princi-
paliter.52 
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reconcile this image with our culture’s comparatively rigid gender roles. 
51“Uns so setzt denn auch wirklich die Religion Alles, was sie mit Bewusststein 
verneint,—vorausgesetzt natürlich, dass dieses von ihr Verneinte etwas an sich Wesen-
haftes, Wahres, folglich nicht zu Verneinendes ist,—unbewusst wieder in Gott. So 
Verneint der Mensch in der Religion seine Vernunft: er weiss nichts aus sich von Gott, 
seine Gedanken sind nur weltlich, irdisch: er kann nur glauben, was Gott ihm geoffen-
bart. Aber dafür sind die Gedanken Gottes menschliche, irdische Gedanken.” In Feuer-
bach (n. 20 above) 33–34; translated text, 27. 
52I would like to thank Professors David Allen and Jane Bishop for their great help 
with the Medieval Latin translations. 
 
